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SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Dr Karen Brewer, Secretary General of 
the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association (CMJA), at 
Uganda House on Thursday 10th January 2013. Karen, thank you very 
much indeed for agreeing to talk to me. I wondered if you could begin by 
telling me please, when you came to the CMJA? 
 
KB: I came to the CMJA in 1998, but I had been involved with the Commonwealth 
since 1987 as I used to work for the Law Society of England and Wales which 
administered the Commonwealth Lawyers Association (CLA). So I’ve worked 
for two Commonwealth organisations in the last 25 years. 
 
SO: What was your view of the CLA in terms of its activities, its influence, its 
organisational strengths and weaknesses? 
 
KB: At the time I was involved, the Commonwealth Lawyers Association was 
administered by the Law Society of England and Wales. And it was quite a 
substantial part of the work that I undertook as a International Relations 
Officer in the International Division (of the Law Society). The CLA was a 
membership organisation, just as the CMJA is a membership organisation. It 
still exists as membership organisation. It did a lot of work in promoting links 
between lawyers on the Commonwealth scene. It had a number of projects to 
advance the organisation of law societies, bar associations and legal 
exchanges within the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Were there legal exchanges with lawyers in South Africa from 1989 
onwards, contributing to the constitutional negotiations? 
 
KB: Not directly, no. There were some links with South Africa: not through the 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association, but there were some links with South 
Africa through the Law Society itself. But they only started to develop when 
President Mandela came to power after apartheid, in 1994. 
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SO: Did the Harare Declaration of 1991 in any way change the focus and 
approach of the CLA? 
 
KB: Yes, because in fact the CLA was one of the founder members of the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), and they’ve been a member 
ever since. They were highly involved in the drafting of the report that went to 
Harare in 1991 from the CHRI which, I believe from a historical point of view, 
had some influence over the way the Harare Declaration was worded at that 
time in 1991. 
 
SO: Were you involved in any of the diplomacy around the drafting of that 
report? 
 
KB: No, I wasn’t. There were advisors on CHRI and I can’t remember the name of 
the CLA representative on the Advisory Commission. The Advisory 
Commissioners were responsible for the drafting of that report. The Executive 
Secretary at the time, Hamish Adamson, was in regular contact with its 
representative on a regular basis. But there was no particular influence; they 
were like the EPG, they were independent people. They received information 
from us, but they had their own views. 
 
SO: So there was no contribution from the CLA to the whole process, to the 
politics around the drafting of the report? 
 
KB: I think there was a contribution to the content to a certain extent, but there 
was no redrafting or editing by CLA or any of the other Commonwealth 
associations who were members of the CHRI. As far as I am aware, it was 
the Advisory Commission to the CHRI that did the drafting beforehand. 
 
SO: Did your organisation send a representative down to the Harare meeting 
in 1991? 
 
KB: No, we didn’t, not in Harare. We didn’t have observer status or an 
accreditation at that particular point. 
 
SO: When did that come? 
 
KB: It came after 1995. Well, it came at Auckland basically. In the run up to the 
CHOGM, we were asked by CHRI to allow representatives from Nigeria to 
use some of places that were allocated to the CLA, as an accredited 
organisation, for Ken Saro Wiwa’s son and I think four other Nigerians who 
attended the CHOGM to try and influence the way things went. Richard 
Bourne probably could tell you a bit more about that side of things because he 
was the one who organised it with the then Executive Secretary at the CLA, 
Hamish Adamson. Hamish was asked by Richard to provide the places for 
these five people to go to Auckland. 
 
SO: Had you or your organisation, the CLA, been in touch with Ken Saro 
Wiwa’s son prior to that point? 
 
KB: We hadn’t been in touch Ken Saro Wiwa’s son, but we had been involved 
through the CLA council member in a lot of the issues related to the situation 
in Nigeria at the time. When the (Nigerian) Bar Association was closed down, 
it was our Council Member who was President of the Bar Association at the 
time that protected the assets of the Bar Association, by blocking them and 
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not allowing the Abacha’s government from taking over the premises and the 
regulation of the lawyers. And we had passed a number of resolutions - I’m 
talking with the CLA hat I had at the time - we had passed a number of 
resolutions on the situation in Nigeria and we had had representation at the 
Commonwealth Law Conferences from Nigeria. Lawyers, including our 
Council Member travelled overland to get out of the country, to come to the 
conference to get support from the Commonwealth legal community for the 
plight of the Nigerian lawyers. 1990 was our New Zealand conference, 1993 
Cyprus, and at the 1996 conference in Toronto as well. In all three 
conferences, we had some representation from the civil society organisation 
or from the Bar Association of Nigeria to come into the conference to ask us 
to put the resolutions. The three conferences produced three resolutions 
about the situation in Nigeria and Nigerian lawyers, to support the Nigerian 
lawyers. We were also very much involved when Param Cumaraswamy was 
UN Rapporteur for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, because he 
had been one of our council members. He was Special Envoy for the UN to 
Nigeria at one point too. We briefed him on the situation on a regular basis 
from our point of view. 
 
SO: Was it contentious getting these resolutions at the CLA conferences, or 
were they unanimous?   
 
KB: Unanimous. 
 
SO: So there was no politicking behind the scenes? There was unanimous 
support for the beleaguered Nigerian Bar Association? 
 
KB: For the lawyers, yes, absolutely. 
 
SO: In what ways were these resolutions then used? As any sort of 
diplomatic crowbar to pressure the British government, or to pressure 
the Abacha regime? 
 
KB: I don’t know if they were used with the British government, but they were 
definitely used to try and get the Commonwealth to listen to us and they were 
communicated to the Commonwealth Secretariat. Because it was a lawyers 
forum, it was also communicated on the legal networks and support was, I 
think, more to do with encouraging support from the legal networks and 
getting the word out to people, ‘This is the situation, and to support our 
colleagues, our sisters and brothers in Nigeria at the time.’ I think that gave 
the Nigerian Human Rights Associations and the Bar Association, courage to 
continue with the fight to restore democracy. 
 
SO: International solidarity is enormously important. 
 
KB: Exactly. It was absolutely paramount in our area of work, and both the 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association, and the Commonwealth Magistrates’ 
and Judges’ Association. 
 
SO: Yes: to communicate that sense of not suffering alone, that there is 
intellectual support and activity on your behalf outside your own 
community. 
 
KB: Yes. The fact that many of the Nigerian lawyers who came to the 
Commonwealth Law Conferences at that time, or came to Council Meetings, 
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was important. Priscilla O’Kuye, the President of the (Nigerian) Bar 
Association was a Council member at that time. And we were never sure that 
she was ever going to appear at the council meetings, because we couldn’t 
communicate on a regular basis with her – there was no internet or emails at 
the time. Telephones were tapped, so you had to be very careful. She found 
her way out, she sometimes walked miles over the borders to get to our 
meetings. But she always turned up in the six years or so she was a member 
of Council. 
 
SO: A woman of great courage. 
 
KB: And we had Olisa Agbakoba and Gani Fawehinmi eminent lawyers from the 
civil liberties organisation at the time. And they walked miles via Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, and other places, to get to our meetings, to talk about the 
situation in Nigeria. These are the courageous people at the frontline that we 
were very, very proud to have tried to help at least. 
 
SO: Yes. Do you recall clearly what the response of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Secretary General was to this attack on the Nigerian 
judiciary?  
 
KB: I don’t know how the Secretary General responded, as that wasn’t really an 
area I was directly involved in. I think they listened and they tried to deal with 
it. Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth in 1995 and it probably 
was part of the influence of what happened afterwards. 
 
SO: In addition to providing the international solidarity and support for the 
beleaguered leader and the members of the Bar Council in Nigeria, did 
you provide any other form of legal advice and support for Ken Saro 
Wiwa and the other Ogoni people who were in detention? 
 
KB: No, not directly, no. We didn’t provide any direct support for that. I think we 
received the funding from CIDA to provide support for their travel to New 
Zealand in conjunction with the CHRI. CIDA (Canadian International 
Development Agency) and the Canadian High Commission in Abuja at that 
time was very helpful. But I was mainly on the periphery of those particular 
negotiations. So it’s only what I remember from what other people told me. 
 
SO: The Millbrook Declaration was made at the Auckland CHOGM in 1995. 
Were you involved in any way? What were your observations of the 
emergence of this Declaration? 
 
KB: We welcomed it. The CLA welcomed the fact that there was now a process in 
place that you could suspend countries that did not comply with the 
Commonwealth fundamental values. And we were a great promoter of the 
Harare Declaration in between 1991 and 1995, as part of CHRI and as part of 
the work that we were doing as lawyers in the Commonwealth. We had an 
obligation to protect the rule of law, good governance and promote Human 
Rights. And so therefore we welcomed that particular advance. Then in 1995 
with the Millbrook Programme of Action, I don’t know if it gave the CLA clout, 
but it gave the law associations something to be able to use. We were able to 
use that and say, “Look, you’re not conforming with Millbrook.” We then on a 
regular basis fed in information, either through the Law Society, or through the 
CLA itself, to the CMAG process when there were threats against lawyers at 
the time. 
 
5 
 
SO: You’re describing an important institutional change in enabling civil 
society actors within the Commonwealth? 
 
KB: Yes, because at that particular time when CMAG was set up, although it was 
for military coups or military governments, you were able to provide direct 
input to CMAG. After I came into this organisation (the CMJA) in 1998 and we 
had the coup in Pakistan, we were invited as CMJA together with CHRI and 
another Commonwealth organisation, as well as local civil society 
organisations and international bodies who worked in Pakistan, to present 
evidence to CMAG in person. 
 
SO: What you’re implying here is a process that has some unexpected 
consequences for some nominally democratic governments within the 
Commonwealth, because CMAG was set up, as you say, explicitly to 
deal with military coups? 
 
KB: Well, it wasn’t explicitly to deal with military coups. It was set up to deal with 
undemocratic processes in the Commonwealth. Now, the interpretation at the 
beginning was it would only deal with military coups because they were the 
most urgent and pressing issues. It did change; it strengthened its 
commitment to dealing with of severe and persistent violations in 2003 (or 
2002?). This coincided with the development of the Commonwealth Latimer 
House Principles as well. Heads of Government agreed to deal with severe 
and persistent violations. But the interpretation of the actual Foreign Ministers 
on CMAG, as to their mandate, didn’t change. 
 
SO: Could you say that’s a constructive tension between civil society 
organisations and Commonwealth governmental heads, or an 
unwelcome evolution of an institution? 
 
KB: It’s an unwelcome evolution, because when Pakistan was reinstated 
Musharaf still hadn’t complied with what we within the CMJA felt were the 
requirements. When Pakistan was reinstated, we felt it was far too early for 
them to have been reinstated because the situation of the judiciary had not 
been resolved at that particular time. When the coup happened in 1999, 
Musharaf obliged judges to sign an oath of allegiance to himself and we said, 
“Well, that was unconstitutional and that it was illegal.” And we said, “That 
shouldn’t have happened” and we made the representations as such to 
CMAG. 
 
SO: In January 2002, the Ministerial Action Group approved Musharaf’s 
roadmap to the October 9 election. And this was what you were not 
endorsing? 
 
KB: Yes, because they approved the roadmap, but they ignored the issue about 
the oath of allegiance of the judiciary, and the situation where the judiciary 
was subjected to political will. We felt that was contrary to the Harare 
Declaration at that time. We did have the Latimer House Guidelines of 1998 
which led to the Principles (in 2003). Although we hadn’t the Principles at that 
particular time, we were saying, “It’s contrary to the Latimer House 
Guidelines. And it’s contrary to all UN principles on the independence of 
judges.” 
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SO: How did you then bring up your protest, your pressure to bear on the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group? 
 
KB: We sent letters to the Secretary General at the time. We sent emails to the 
Political Affairs division and the Legal and Constitutional Affairs division at the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. I think in fact we may have sent a letter to the 
chairman of CMAG at the time, I’m not too sure. I’d have to check that. But 
these messages were prior to the decision in 2002; they didn’t take into 
account the issues. 
 
SO: So you were lobbying entirely through the Commonwealth structures 
rather than trying to use the British-Pakistan bilateral relationship? 
 
KB: No, no, we have never used that. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering about that avenue, as here we are physically sitting 
in Uganda House in Trafalgar Square, with Whitehall down the road. 
 
KB: Because we’re a judicial organisation and we are a charity, we have to be 
careful about politicisation of the work that we do. We are an apolitical 
organisation. So therefore we have worked through the Commonwealth to 
advance the issues relating to the Commonwealth fundamental values in 
certain countries. Most of that work has been done, until very recently, 
through several subtle channels. We don’t publicise what we’ve done. 
 
SO: This is ‘outer diplomacy’? 
 
KB: Outer diplomacy, yes, and it’s just as valid. When there have been 
Commonwealth meetings we have raised the issue from time to time, 
depending on what the issue was. We’ve fed into the special envoys, but 
unfortunately most of the special envoys have got very limited terms of 
reference; in the cases of Pakistan and Fiji at that time, their terms of 
reference did not really include the position of the judiciary. And I will be 
honest: I think a lot of the problems that arose in Fiji after that time, from 2000 
onwards, related to the division, the split in the judiciary created after the 
previous coup. The problems that we’re now facing with the Fijians being 
suspended from the Commonwealth for a number of years, relate to that time 
because the special envoy was not really given the terms of reference to deal 
with the judicial problem. 
 
SO: The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Groups listed Fiji’s suspension 
from the Commonwealth in December 2000, but kept it on the agenda 
until the Supreme Court ruled on the government’s constitutionality. 
 
KB: But they didn’t deal with the split within the judiciary. And that was a major 
issue in the coup at the time. That was a problem for us because we had two 
sides of the judiciary who were at loggerheads; and when the coup happened 
in 2006, Colonel Banaimarama used that split judiciary to produce a coup 
within the judiciary itself. He appointed as Chief Justice, a judge who had 
previously been a strong supporter of judicial independence which only 
exacerbated the situation and the creation of a system where judges were 
compromised by supporting a change in regime. 
 
SO: Because it was a political appointment, contravening independence of 
the judiciary? 
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KB: It contravened the judicial services commission process and the provisions of 
the constitution at the time. And unfortunately the process was completely 
flawed, so the independence of the Acting Chief Justice who was then 
appointed Chief Justice, was tainted. His position was compromised by 
agreeing to serve under those circumstances. Then when the constitution was 
suspended a year later, most of the Court of Appeal judges resigned and 
some of the judges of the High Court resigned. But the Chief Justice didn’t 
resign. 
 
 SO: You had moved by this point in 1998, from the CLA – the 
Commonwealth Law Association - to the CMJA, but obviously you kept 
your affiliation within the CLA? 
 
KB: Yes, I’d moved in March ‘98. I kept my affiliation with the CLA. We worked 
very closely with the CLA because we were joint supporters and sponsors of 
the Latimer House Colloquium Principles. In fact, it was the CMJA who got 
me involved in the preparatory work for the Latimer House Joint colloquium in 
1997 prior to my commencing in the post at the CMJA. And I got the CLEA 
involved, so therefore all four organisations (CLA, CMJA, CLEA and CPA) 
were linked in. I was invited to as CLA representative to a meeting with the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association by the former Secretary General of 
the CMJA, and then during the preparations for the Colloquium, I moved from 
CLA to CMJA. 
 
SO: Are you unusual in moving smoothly between these organisations, or 
are there others that – 
 
KB: No, others have done so, and have moved between organisations. There are 
quite a few people who have moved between Commonwealth associations. 
 
SO: So it gives actually greater strength to the CMJA precisely, because of 
that close affiliation between the CLA and the CMJA, even though in 
administrative and financial terms, CMJA is a separate entity? 
 
KB: We have to keep our independence because lawyers and judges have to be 
independent from each other too. 
 
SO: So the CLA is an association of ‘advocacy’, whether CMJA is an 
association of ‘adjudication’? 
 
KB: Yes, exactly. As an organisation, we work very closely together in the 
advocacy on the fundamental rights and fundamental values of the 
Commonwealth. I see my role being the representative of the judiciary, 
magistrates and judges as we’re the only international organisation that 
brings the magistrates and judges together. I see my role as trying to work 
with organisations that promote good governance and the rule of law, to 
advance these principles as far as we can, but with an emphasis on the 
judiciary. We work very closely with the CLA … I don’t know if I want this on 
the record but I have contributed to many of the statements that the CLA have 
produced over the last five years or ten years up until say recently, which 
relate to judicial independence. 
 
SO: You have given your professional opinion as the Secretary General of 
the CMJA. 
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KB: Yes. 
 
SO: I’m very interested in actual process, away from public presentation of 
process. 
 
KB: Yes, that’s it. Well, there is no actual recognised process: Until recently the 
CMJA Council and Membership did not feel that the CMJA should make 
public statements. We have worked behind the scenes to persuade the 
Commonwealth Secretariat to consider threats against judicial independence 
on the same level as other democratic crisis. If we can’t persuade the 
Commonwealth to advance the issues raised with us, then we also use our 
other networks to advance the issues. 
 
SO: Absolutely, that’s the point of networks. 
 
KB: And the CLA has been a very good network for us, not to influence, but to 
provide advice to and support. We have also worked very closely with the 
International Bar Association and the International Commission of Jurists in 
the past; and we work closely with the UN Rapporteur on Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers. We need to ensure we get the message across without 
putting lives into jeopardy. I think this is one of the points that we have to be 
always aware of. It came to the fore in the late 1990s and early 2000, when 
Zimbabwe were going through problems. Chief Justice Gubbay was in a very 
difficult position at the time. There was absolutely no way that we could make 
a public statement about the problems facing the judiciary in Zimbabwe as we 
were placing peoples’ lives in jeopardy. 
 
SO: As Ken Saro Wiwa proved this, before the Millbrook Declaration? 
 
KB: Yes, exactly. So that’s why we’ve worked very closely with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, to get them to put the pressure on governments, 
because they are the inter-governmental organisation. We were very much 
aware of pressures that were brought to bear in Zimbabwe, and we were very 
much aware of communications monitoring as well. We tried to get the 
message to the Chief Justice and to the various judges that we are there and 
we’re working in the background, but we’re not making public statements 
about it. If we’re asked by a Chief Justice or one of our organisations to do 
something about it, then we’ve got something to hold on to. But even then it’s 
discreet advice we provide to the Commonwealth usually; we can’t always 
say what we’re doing, but we’re doing something. And if they ask us for 
information then that’s fine, we can provide it. We can provide information on 
an objective basis. If they ask us for help, then we do the work behind the 
scenes. 
 
SO: That is acting in a responsive role? 
 
KB: In the case of the Solomon Islands, when the Chief Justice and the judiciary 
were under threat in the late 1990s: I think it was late 1999, or early 2000, the 
Chief Justice’s daughter was assaulted and a few others were mugged. He 
sent an email to us and he said, “We need help.” I said, “Can I send this 
information on?” Now you would say ‘go viral’, but you know, it would be viral 
within a confined network. And so I used my network: I used the IBA, the 
CLA, the Law Society of England and Wales, Human Rights groups and any 
organisations that I was linked into at the time. And as a result, the Chief 
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Justice and the judiciary in the Solomon Islands felt that they had the support 
outside, they knew they had solidarity outside. So they were able to work 
together to protect judicial independence. This didn’t happen in Fiji. In the 
Solomon Islands, they stood as a group and said, “Well, we’re right.” A united 
front against the world; or the politicians. We were trying to influence the way 
things were going. That’s an extremely important issue. And over the years 
the CMJA has worked on strengthening that solidarity, and strengthening its 
work on judicial independence. 
 
SO: So there’s been a shift of the CMJA from an establishment to a much 
more pro-active organisation? 
 
KB: Absolutely. When I came into the office I was accused of leaving the activist 
association (The Law Society of England and Wales) to go to the 
establishment by a former member of staff of LIBERTY. She said, “Karen, 
you’ve joined the establishment.” And I said, “Well, I’m not so sure I have.” 
Some of our members don’t want us to do things. Some of them say “It’s 
okay, we’ll deal with it.” And we have to respect their wishes and that’s fine. 
We don’t do anything without first asking what our Members want us to do. 
But sometimes it’s very clear that they want us to do something. 
 
SO: What do you do if the members are divided among themselves within 
the country? 
 
KB: That happened in Fiji. That is a difficult issue. We then look towards the 
Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles and say, “Look, as far as we’re 
aware, these principles are being violated“. We still continue to advocate for 
change but we monitor the situation. And in the case of Fiji, because there 
was a split -part of the judiciary was compliant/complicit with the coup in 
2000, part weren’t - we tried to get the Commonwealth Special Envoy to work 
with the judiciary to resolve the conflicting issues. But that process didn’t 
work. Unfortunately there are problems with special envoys – It seems there 
is more emphasis on resolving the political or democratic issues relating to 
elections - Not on the structure to strengthen the judiciary as a third branch of 
power. They are happy to deal with the legislature, with the executive, but 
they’re forgetting the judiciary. 
 
One of the big problems that we still face is that in the Commonwealth the 
judiciary is still not considered important to democracy. Within 
Commonwealth governments, the judiciary is still not considered an equal 
partner in power. We are the third branch of power. But the judiciary is being 
eroded: you see that through budgetary cuts, you see that in this country 
through pension cuts. And then you see that in other places: the argument is 
‘It’s part of the Department of Justice, so therefore we don’t need to think 
about the independence of the judiciary.’ At the Commonwealth level, it 
doesn’t figure in the terms of reference of many special envoys to strengthen 
the judiciary. 
 
SO: Is that a reflection that varying value is attached to the independence of 
the judiciary within Commonwealth members? 
 
KB: Exactly. One of the things that I was brought in to do was to promote the 
image of the judiciary within the Commonwealth: to promote the image of the 
CMJA, but also to promote the influence of the judiciary. People pay lip 
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service to the constitutional provision: ‘An independent judiciary is 
guaranteed.’ 
 
SO: But Karen, you said it yourself, you were brought in to promote the 
image of the judiciary, and your role is to promote the influence of the 
judiciary. 
 
KB: Exactly, because they can’t promote themselves, they’ve got to be 
independent. And the issue is not that we want to promote the image of the 
judiciary, we want to make sure that people recognise the separation of 
powers; really it’s three branches, not just two and ‘we’ll forget about the 
judiciary.’ 
 
SO: Karen, it’s enormously important, particularly with the growing 
emphasis on democratisation as a key adjunct to development. With 
economic and political liberalisation, the contemporary emphasis is on 
good governance: the judiciary sits firmly, squarely, in the middle of 
that. 
 
KB: Yes. Without an independent judiciary you won’t have good governance. And 
whatever the debate’s currently about – for example, the Sri Lankan Chief 
Justice and her impeachment - whatever you think about whether or not the 
process is right or not, the politicisation of the judiciary through this process 
just demonstrates how little consideration has been given to the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
SO: If we could go back to the Latimer House Principles, and talk more 
about Pakistan, as well as Fiji, Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka. 
 
KB: We did a lot of work in Fiji and Pakistan as well. On Pakistan, I think what I 
would say is perhaps to emphasise what you said about the CMAG process. 
We welcomed the opportunity to go to the CMAG meeting here; and sit in and 
listen to the debate and contribute to it. We were given an opportunity to 
speak. We had to prepare both a written submission and an oral submission. 
It was about 2001 or somewhere around that time. We were one of the 
Commonwealth Associations who were asked to make submissions and the 
CHRI was the other. And I think the Commonwealth Press Union might have 
been involved; and then there was the Aga Khan Foundation and a number of 
civil society organisations there, who were all allowed to make short five 
minute presentations on their findings, which contributed to the debates. We 
were allowed to sit in and then observe the actual debates of the foreign 
ministers. 
 
SO: And what was your professional viewpoint of those debates? 
 
KB: They were very logical debates, but I think what we appreciated was to being 
involved and asked for our views on the challenges in Pakistan. That was 
what was appreciated; because we were there, we were able to listen to what 
the ministers were saying. We weren’t part of the decision process. We 
weren’t there for the decision process, but we were there for a lot of the 
debates on the issues, and a lot of the input from the British government, from 
all the governments actually. 
 
SO: So there’s a question of transparency for civil society organisations? 
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KB: Well, for our associations who were there, definitely. 
 
SO: I’m just thinking of the value of that informed debate, rather than an 
exclusive, narrow elite discussion. 
 
KB: Absolutely, yes. We appreciated it enormously. Although I didn’t have a lot of 
information, I was able to get information from my member association or 
from individual members in Pakistan at that time, which enhanced our 
presentation. We had a double opportunity as we would at a ministerial 
meeting: to have a written submission and the oral submission. We had to 
limit our oral submission - we were six organisations who were given the 
opportunity to speak and present. 
 
SO: So again this was an evolution of the consultation and information 
process within the Commonwealth? 
 
KB: Yes, and that was fantastic from our point of view. It’s regrettable that CMAG 
no longer used this method after that meeting as far as I am aware. 
 
SO: Would you care to speculate, or do you have any idea why that would 
have been a one-off? 
 
KB: There was a change in the CMAG membership. The chairman changed, the 
content changed and civil society was no longer invited to make submissions 
in person. We have lobbied since then for us to do it again, to be allowed 
some kind of formal network, a formal system to appear under the Latimer 
House process. And I’ll come back to that. But so far we’re still waiting. 
 
SO: You were obviously intimately involved in the negotiations around the 
Latimer House process. 
 
KB: I was intimately right from the beginning, at the CLA and then the CMJA. We 
were involved in the first joint colloquium which led to the guidelines being 
adopted in 1998 at Latimer House. Dr Peter Slinn (of the CLEA) and I were 
intimately involved in the drafting of the guidelines, because they were done 
in June 1998, during the joint colloquium. 
 
  The guidelines were agreed between representatives of the four 
organisations: the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, ourselves, 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association and Commonwealth Legal and 
Education Association. And the guidelines were adopted in 1998. They were 
a non-governmental paper, though the colloquium itself was funded with 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Foundation and British 
government support. The four organisations were keen for the Guidelines to 
be adopted across the Commonwealth. There was a lot of debate within the 
law ministers about whether or not the guidelines should be adopted in full. 
We were granted observer status at the senior officials of law Ministers 
Meetings and we were able to talk at these meetings and then at the Law 
Ministers meetings in St Vincent’s, and Trinidad & Tobago. We had 
representatives at both those meetings. 
 
In St Vincent’s the Commonwealth Law Ministers rejected the Guidelines and 
threw them back to senior officials. They had a number of issues to do with 
appointment systems, and budgets - who controlled the budgets, because we 
had said the judiciary should control the budget for the judiciary and with 
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appointments, they said, “Well we can suggest a judicial appointments 
commission.” Following St Vincent’s the Latimer House Working Group (set 
up by the four organisations in 1998) added footnotes to the Latimer House 
Guidelines to clarify certain issues. We had debates within our own 
associations as to what we should add and what we shouldn’t have in the 
Guidelines. One major issue was about judicial and public appointments. It 
was important that appointments should ensure that there was no longer any 
historic discrimination on the basis of gender and race and all those issues. 
That was a footnote we put in following the Commonwealth Law Conference 
in 1999 in Kuala Lumpur. The Guidelines were therefore refined. And we then 
we re-presented them to the senior officials meeting after St Vincent’s; some 
governments interpreted the law ministers throwing it back to the senior 
officials as a kicking it into the long grass. The Gibraltar Premier mentioned 
this in particular. This led to a number of rebuttals that I had to make as 
secretary of the Latimer House Working Group, about what the referral to the 
senior officials really meant. 
 
SO: The politics around all of this: was it personal, was it constitutional, was 
it national political? 
 
KB: National political and constitutional probably in many cases. In the case of 
Gibraltar, I think it was probably political, because there were problems of 
judicial independence in Gibraltar. 
 
SO: Is that because of the anomalous position of Gibraltar as a British 
overseas dependency? 
 
KB: No, it’s because of the personalities. 
 
SO: So was a case of internal Gibraltar politics influencing their official 
attitude? 
 
KB: Yes. The Premier (Caruna) was a lawyer, and was confident of his 
interpretation of the meaning judicial independence which didn’t quite fit into 
what the Latimer House Guidelines were saying. There were a number of 
representations that were made implying that the Guidelines were going 
nowhere. The main issue was after the St Vincent’s Meeting some 
governments felt that the decision made by Ministers meant that the 
Guidelines were not to be taken forward. But in a sense, we took that as a 
challenge to us in the Latimer House Working Group. 
 
SO: Excuse me, who’s ‘we’? 
 
KB: After the Guidelines were drafted and circulated and we had put it on the 
agenda for the senior officials, the representatives from the four organisations 
who had been involved with the joint colloquium (CLA, CMJA, CLEA & CPA), 
came together in a working group and we’ve been a working group ever since 
under my secretariat here. So we created a Latimer House Working Group to 
advance the Guidelines firstly and then the Commonwealth (Latimer House) 
Principles distilled from these Guidelines secondly. So when I say ‘we’, I 
mean the Latimer House Working Group took it as a challenge. There are 
more than four representatives on it: it’s got the four organisations on it, and 
the Commonwealth Secretariat is represented on it. We can speak without 
the Commonwealth Secretariat there, but then we don’t necessarily represent 
ourselves as the Latimer House Working Group. We might say ‘ the four 
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organisations on the Latimer House Working Group are...’ But we’ve got the 
Commonwealth Secretariat because we wanted them to actually advance 
these guidelines into principles. 
 
SO: How senior is the Commonwealth Secretariat representative? 
 
KB:  It used to be the Director of the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Division 
starting with Diane Stafford– now we have representatives of the Justice 
Section. 
 
SO: I was struck by what Purna Sen said at the Sri Lanka CA/B meeting 
about the question of standing within the Secretariat of human rights, 
that it didn’t have a status of being a full division. It was an office, and 
as such this was indicative of the particular lower political importance 
within the organisation of human rights issues. I was wondering 
whether it was the same with the level of importance accorded to 
Latimer Working Group liaison. 
 
KB: Under the previous Secretary General, Don McKinnon, we had very strong 
support from the office of the Secretary General. 
 
SO: Was that very closely tied, would you think, with the persona and the 
attitude to the authority of office and the role of the Commonwealth SG, 
Don McKinnon? Or was it the particular dynamism of Diane Stafford? 
 
KB: It was a combination of the dynamism of the then Deputy Secretary General, 
Kris Srinivasan who supported the Latimer House Principles, and who gave 
us the money for the first colloquium. It was the support of Di Stafford as well, 
and then Betty Mould Idrissu within the Legal Division: both of them took this 
forward. But the direction when it came to the law ministers was taken, 
especially in Trinidad & Tobago, by the Secretary General himself. Between 
the St Vincent’s and Trinidad & Tobago meetings, we had refined the 
guidelines. At St Vincent’s it was said we needed an expert group, and an 
expert group was put together. That included ministers from Kenya, 
Singapore and South Africa as well as representation from the UK. But it also 
included our four organisations. It’s the first time a ministerial action expert 
group actually included NGOs. So we were part of the drafting process for 
those principles. So we worked with those ministers to get the principles 
drafted. We provided the first draft of the principles. 
 
SO: This is, after all, acting in best bureaucratic practice for providing policy 
drafts?  
  
KB: Exactly. They were never going to accept the guidelines which were 10 pages 
long. So they needed a summarised version. We provided the first draft of the 
summarised version for discussion. We talked about it. We were part of the 
decision making process as to what should be included and what shouldn’t be 
included. We acted as a full member of the expert group basically. And we 
came up with a draft which was then circulated by the Legal Division to all 
senior officials and law ministers. The senior officials before the Trinidad 
meeting said, “Okay, well this seems good enough, you know. Tweak it here 
and there, but it seems good enough.” And that was then sent on to the 
Trinidad & Tobago meeting. Now, I was not there in Trinidad & Tobago. We 
had a representative there but I wasn’t there personally. But I know that there 
was quite a big debate in Trinidad, at the ministerial meeting. There was a 
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very big risk in Trinidad that the Principles were not going to gain consensus. 
And it was only because of the diligence of Don McKinnon who saw this as a 
very important document that it went through. He put his political weight and 
authority of office behind the draft; he used discussions in the wings of the 
ministerial meeting on this particular issue, so that we were able to get it 
through the law ministers. And then once it got through the law ministers, it 
was then a document we could then take forward to CHOGM, but it was very 
much touch and go. I think it was only because Don McKinnon talked to a few 
ministers, and did some private diplomacy. But once it got through law 
ministers, then it gave us the authority to use that document around the 
Commonwealth. The then UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers at the time, who was still Param Cumaraswamy was 
then able to use the principles when he went on missions across the 
Commonwealth. He could then quote the Latimer House principles, endorsed 
by law ministers. 
 
SO: Yes. You’ve got a referential document that has been agreed. 
 
KB: Exactly, that has been agreed by the governments. It still wasn’t adopted by 
CHOGM but at least then of course the process was (in progress). The law 
Ministers came to an agreement by May 2003 and then The Principles were 
put forward to CHOGM in the November in Abuja. 
 
SO: Were there more private objections behind the scenes? 
 
KB: Not that I am aware of. And I was not privy to anything, and we weren’t invited 
to the debates. The arguments had taken place in the previous year. In 
November 2003, that was when Zimbabwe left; in a sense they were about to 
suspend Zimbabwe when they left. So the Latimer House Principles was the 
positive element coming out of the Abuja CHOGM. And so that’s the process 
which led to the Principles. And of course from then on we have been 
concerned about the implementation of the Principles. We had great support 
from Don McKinnon and from the Legal Division through Betty Mould Idrissu 
and her staff. That led in turn to us having the Pan African colloquium on the 
Principles in 2005, which came up with a plan of action for Africa. This 
included giving the Secretary General the obligation to report to Heads of 
Government on the situation in Africa. Since then, before every CHOGM we 
have prepared a report on the whole of the Commonwealth - not just Africa, 
but on the whole of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Again, is that your initiative, Karen? 
 
KB: Yes, that’s our initiative. The Latimer House Working Group does a report to 
help the Secretary General in his reporting back. Ever since we’ve done a 
report prior to every CHOGM meeting; about three months prior, we report on 
the good and bad practices vis-à-vis Latimer House. 
 
SO: How have those reports gone down at successive CHOGMS? 
 
KB: We’ve been thanked by the Secretary General. I don’t know whether he uses 
it, but we have been thanked by the Secretary General for our submissions. 
 
SO: Has anybody else thanked you? 
 
KB: No, I don’t think so, no. 
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SO: Has anybody else come up to you quietly afterwards and objected to 
this report? 
 
KB: No. It’s a private report for the Secretary General. It’s to be used in his own 
report. So I don’t know how he uses it in his own report, on issues of that 
kind. So it’s a private thing, but I know most of the Secretariat staff see it. It’s 
private and confidential; it’s usually more the Directors who see it. 
 
SO: ‘Private and confidential’ documents have a habit of 20 copies being 
circulated.  
 
KB: Yes, something like that. Anyway, so that was the Pan African forum and that 
gave us also some obligations. One of the obligations of the Guidelines was 
that we should be the repository of the ethical codes for the judiciary in the 
Commonwealth. And we had done a lot of work in that area on strengthening 
the ethical codes. We do a biennial trawl of Commonwealth jurisdictions, to 
where their codes are and if they have codes - because we have a copy. 
We’ve got between 38 and 40 Commonwealth codes or guidelines of conduct 
for judicial officers. This is something that maybe 20 years ago no judiciary in 
the world would have thought about. But now a majority of Commonwealth 
countries have got codes of conduct for their judiciaries. So it’s not just 
dealing with independence of the judiciary, it’s also dealing with their own 
internal codes. We also contributed to the Bangalore Code of Conduct on 
corruption in the judiciary which was adopted by the UN. So we’ve worked on 
that and on those projects as well. 
 
We’re talking about accountability and independence as well. So we were 
balancing both things. It’s all part of the Latimer House process. One of the 
issues in Latimer House was that although we had a Pan African Plan of 
Action, we didn’t have anything for the rest of the Commonwealth. So we 
organised a joint colloquium in the wings of the law ministers meeting in 
Edinburgh in 2008, which included some ministers and senior officials as well. 
Now we report regularly to the Senior Officials of Law Ministries and Law 
Ministers themselves on Latimer House issues. 
 
SO: How often do Commonwealth law ministers meet? 
 
KB: Every three years. And in between there’s a Senior Officials of Law Ministries 
meeting. And there’s a meeting of small states’ law ministers. So this 
September (2013) there will be a meeting of the senior officials of law 
ministers, and law ministers of small states. And then in 2014 there will be a 
meeting with the law ministers. So we (the Latimer House Working Group) 
report to senior officials, then senior officials take the agenda on to law 
ministers. The senior officials of law ministries meetings are usually in 
London. We feed into the Law Ministers meeting. The last time we didn’t do a 
report to the Law Ministers of Small States and one of the Ministers enquired 
why it wasn’t on the agenda for that particular meeting though it had been 
part of the agenda for the Senior Officials of Law Ministries Meeting. So I was 
asked to provide an update to the Small States Ministers Meeting. We are 
also given the opportunity as partner organisations and observers to provide 
a report on our activities. Part of our written report would include an update on 
judicial independence issues. 
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But coming back to Edinburgh: we were able to have a colloquium. 2008 was 
the 10th anniversary of the Latimer House Guidelines and the 5th anniversary 
of the Principles. We were given the opportunity to run a second joint 
colloquium which, like the first one, brought together lawyers, judges, 
politicians, and some of the ministers who were attending the ministerial 
meeting to discuss the issues together. We came up with what we call now 
the Edinburgh Plan of Action which reflects a lot of the action agreed in 
Nairobi in 2005. In the Edinburgh Plan of Action we proposed, on the advice 
of a then Commonwealth Secretariat member of staff, to set up the standing 
committee to provide information on good and bad practice on Latimer House 
issues around the Commonwealth, as well as other ways of implementing 
Latimer House. 
 
This was to feed into CMAG, and to the good offices. It was to help. It would 
have included our organisations but it would have included other 
organisations like the Commonwealth local government forum and the media 
organisations who would feed in by a proper mechanism. It was an excellent 
idea, but senior officials said no, law ministers said no. So we continue to 
monitor implementation of the Principles through the Latimer House Working 
Group on an ad hoc basis. 
 
SO: But you wanted to provide it in an institutional standardised form? 
 
KB: We wanted to give it an institutional and standardised form. So when they 
said no, we said, “Okay, well we already do it on an ad hoc basis.” We still do 
it on an ad hoc basis. 
 
SO: How ad hoc is that? 
 
KB: As ad hoc as an overworked Secretary General can monitor what’s going on, 
and as ad hoc as people feed in information to this. 
 
SO: Given your dedicated working practices, Karen, I’d say you make it as 
standardised as possible. 
 
KB: Well yes, as much as possible as we can. There are other ways that we can 
encourage the implementation of the Latimer House principles. We’ve run 
seminars and training courses. And all our organisations include Latimer 
House issues in their conferences or their educational programmes. It’s been 
a standardised issue in all the training that we’ve done with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, or without, on ethics and judicial independence.  
In the CMJA’s case - and it appears in CLA and we see them in conferences - 
it’s on the agenda all the time as an active issue. After the second Latimer 
House colloquium in 2008, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association got 
an email from the Legislature of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) to say, 
“We want to implement Latimer House in ACT. We need to know how it’s 
being implemented elsewhere.” We said, “Well, you’re the first!” 
 
SO: ‘So you can be our model’? 
 
KB: So we provided background information and details of everything that they 
needed. In fact they’re basically our model for everything now. It’s a small 
jurisdiction; although it’s part of Australia, it’s a small jurisdiction within 
Australia. Because it’s a small jurisdiction, they are experiencing the same 
issues as other small jurisdictions, and we’ve got a lot of small jurisdictions in 
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the Commonwealth. So we provided information through the CPA, through 
ourselves and they did a first report. They said, “This is what we’re going to 
do, we’re going to put somebody in charge. We’re going to try and get a 
model together.” We worked with them a couple of times. It was quite 
interesting that the ACT legislature was a very positive influence. In 2011 I 
went to Kiribati on a needs assessment mission with the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. I was asked to visit the Legal Counsel in Parliament. Everywhere 
we go, we arm ourselves with the little blue booklet (ie: the compiled 
documents relating to the Latimer House Principles) And I started to talk 
about Latimer House and he said, “It’s okay, it’s been dealt with. Two people 
from the ACT legislature are talking about Latimer House at the moment for 
the newly elected parliament.” That was impressive so far away from the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and Latimer House itself. There we were, sitting 
in Tarawa: I’d taken 20 copies of the booklet, I think my colleague had too. 
And in fact we didn’t need to distribute these. 
 
We felt in Don McKinnon’s time the implementation of the Latimer House 
Principles were a priority. Don McKinnon mentioned it every time he had a 
speech on governance: he mentioned it 25 times! His staff was diligent in 
mentioning the Latimer House process. In 2005 Don McKinnon was 
instrumental in the Principles becoming an integral part of the Commonwealth 
fundamental values. But when Don McKinnon left in 2008, we felt that the 
priority lapse. And of course Betty Mould Iddrisu left shortly after. It hasn’t 
been given the same priority as it should have been recently. The problem we 
have been facing recently is that whereas we used to feel that at least we 
were listened to, now we are not. I think ever since Pakistan was allowed 
back into the Commonwealth, the CMAG hasn’t been listening to what we’ve 
had to say, allowing countries in that clearly still violate the Commonwealth 
principles. 
 
SO: If I could just go onto Zimbabwe and the politics of the Commonwealth 
reaction to Zimbabwe’s violation of these principles: you say that at the 
Abuja CHOGM, Robert Mugabe withdrew Zimbabwe from the 
Commonwealth. As a civil society organisation, are you still in touch 
with members of the Zimbabwe Judiciary?  
 
KB: Not really, no. There membership lapsed because of they withdrew from the 
Commonwealth. The independence of the judiciary was compromised. A lot 
of the judiciary resigned in the run up to 2003. People were appointed on 
dubious terms. Some of the judges appointed by the President were given the 
same land deals on ‘political variable’ terms which mean that their 
independence is compromised. There are a few that are still trying to work 
independently, but at the level that counts, it doesn’t get very far. We have 
worked behind the scenes to try and help. This is where we work with the 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association, and the Commonwealth Legal 
Education Association; Peter Slinn is a member of the Zimbabwe CSO forum 
that was set up a few years ago and represents the lawyers and the CLEA. 
But we still keep in touch with them about issues. But we don’t have direct 
contact anymore with any of the judges in Zimbabwe. 
 
SO: Are you aware whether there’s been any approach from MDC to the 
CLA, requesting advice on constitutional reform? 
 
KB: I’m not aware of any approach from Zimbabwe directly, from MDC or anybody 
there. 
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SO: That would be complicated, I realise, but I just wondered whether there 
was any solicited and provided advice. 
 
KB: No, as far as I am aware, there’s been none at all. 
 
SO: What of Sri Lanka? 
 
KB: Sri Lanka? That’s a nightmare. Going back to what I said before, because of 
the frustration we have been experiencing recently, where we feel that our 
briefings on problems in the judiciary in relation to Papua New Guinea firstly, 
in relations to the situation in Zambia, in relation to a few things that have 
happened in South Africa, have not been fully taken on board by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. In Papua New Guinea, the Chief Justice last year 
was sacked, reappointed, re-sacked, reappointed, arrested - all in a short 
time frame between August 2011 and January 2012. There was a problem 
with the prime minister-ship and there was a challenge. This is just a bit of 
background: the Prime Minister left for medical treatment to go to Australia I 
think, and whilst he was there in Australia, the Speaker of Parliament took 
over his position. 
 
SO: Under constitutional arrangements, or he just arrogated authority? 
 
KB: He assumed authority. And got the Parliament to say there was a vote of no 
confidence while the prime minister was out of the country. This led to the 
Prime Minister Michael Somari coming back, challenging in court this 
procedure. Before the Supreme Court said, “Yes, he’s right”, the acting Prime 
Minister in post didn’t like this challenge and claimed that the Chief Justice 
was politicised. So they suspended him, pending examination of his 
behaviour. But then they realised they couldn’t do that because the 
procedures in place, so they had to reinstate The Chief Justice. The Supreme 
Court then sat without the Chief Justice and judged that the removal of the 
Chief Justice was illegal and he had to be re-instated. In the meantime, this 
case is going on through the courts and in the end they found in favour of the 
Prime Minister who’d gone for medical illnesses. The day after that happened 
the Chief Justice was then sacked again. It was a very complicated case with 
all the ins and outs!  
 
SO: At what point were you alerted, or involved? 
 
KB: We were alerted from September onwards because it was 2011 so we were 
in Malaysia and we had people from Papua New Guinea coming to our 
conference. The Chief Justice couldn’t come to our conference. The 
Commonwealth Secretariat had scheduled a judicial training for January 
2012. From September to December 2011 we weren’t sure what was going to 
happen. In the meantime other organisations such as LawAsia became 
involved. Our Australian membership became concerned and contacted us. 
We sent an email to the Commonwealth Secretariat expressing our concern 
and two letters to the Secretary General but we felt they were not taking the 
situation seriously throughout. 
 
SO: Not taking a stand on the Latimer Principles? 
 
KB: Yes, they weren’t taking it seriously enough. In the end, they reinstated the 
Chief Justice in time for the Com Sec training course at attended by members 
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of the judiciary and magistracy. It was on ethics and judicial independence. 
Some Australian judges who were sitting temporarily in the Court of Appeal to 
clear the backlog of cases also attended. The week after the training course, 
these judges had to go back to Australia; and the day after they left, or even 
as they were on the plane, they arrested the PNG Chief Justice on perversion 
of the course of justice, or whatever it was. The reaction from the 
Commonwealth Secretariat was limited to an acknowledgment of our 
notification of events in PNG. 
 
The Secretary General says that he can’t tell us every time there have been 
discussions behind the scenes. He has to deal with these issues with delicacy 
and using subtle diplomacy. We have done it that way ourselves in the past. 
 
SO: Discreet diplomacy. 
 
KB: Discreet diplomacy. But it was a series of excessively discrete diplomacy 
which led to us thinking, ‘Well, hang on. It’s not on CMAG, it’s not even 
mentioned in the communiqués. Nothing has been mentioned. We’re not 
getting the feedback from people. At the same time we had the problem 
within the judiciary in Malawi. In Malawi we had court staff on strike from 
January through to March 2012, because their pay rises which had been 
agreed by two legislatures in a row, had not been implemented by the 
government. The courts were all closed in Malawi for three months. And 
nobody was acting on it. Then the judges decided, ’Well we’re going to join 
them because we’re in the same boat as the court staff. They haven’t been 
paid, our review hasn’t been implemented for two legislatures, so yes, we’re 
going to do the same thing.’ 
 
So we had everybody on strike in the judiciary in the month of March last year 
in Malawi. I just happened to send an email about the whole situation just as 
the Secretary General went to Malawi in March. Simon (Gimson) said, “Okay, 
right, well its part of our briefing, thanks very much, Karen. I’ll report back 
after we come back.” I got no report back. I got nothing. I saw the 
communiqué and it said, “We have agreed with the President that we will 
provide training for the judiciary.’ Nothing about rule of law, good governance 
and the situation there. It’s frustrating when we spend hours trying to help 
these people. We gave them the name of the person at the Malawi judiciary 
to contact. Nobody contacted the judiciary. The Secretary General didn’t 
actually see any members of the judiciary; as far as I know he didn’t even see 
the Chief Justice, unless it was at a reception, I’m not so sure. But we were 
so frustrated. That was Malawi. 
 
At the same time all that was happening, in the Maldives the senior civil judge 
who had been at our conference in 2011, was kidnapped in January 2012 and 
couldn’t be found. There was a ruction within the Maldives, ‘where was he? 
What was he doing?’ So we sent an urgent message again around the same 
time (to the Secretariat) saying, “What are you doing about this?” And then 
they said, “Oh well, we’re looking into it. We’re not sure what we’re going to 
do. We’ll see what we’re doing. Or we might send a mission out.” I said, 
“You’ve got to send a high level mission.” It ended up being the Director of the 
Legal Division and the head of the Justice section going. That was not high 
enough as far as we were concerned. This was a kidnapping; and it was in 
the third and a half week of the kidnapping that they sent Akbar Khan, Jarvis 
Matiya and a couple of others out with them to the Maldives. Whilst they were 
in the air, the President was allegedly forced to resign at gunpoint. It was only 
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then that CMAG came into it, only then that they said, “We’d better send out 
an even higher delegation”. Only then did the new CMAG process came into 
it (ie: a virtual meeting of CMAG members and decisions taken after that). It is 
frustrating when there is inaction on such a serious issue! 
 
SO: Question, how far do you see the problem at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, being a problem of funding? 
 
KB: No. That’s not the problem, funding. I don’t have the funds to respond! I can 
ring the Chief Justice up and you’re getting up-to-date information. I know the 
Malawi Chief Justice’s telephone number; when we had the first crisis in 
Malawi in 2002/2003, I was on the telephone. It’s not a question of resources.  
It’s a question of political will. And what you interpret as being part of your 
remit, because from the time that Musharaf in 2002 to the review of the 
CMAG, there was all the problems. The Sri Lankan Foreign Minister was the 
chairman of CMAG before the last CHOGM. So any issues related to political 
intervention in the judiciary or stuff like that were not heard. Whilst it was 
agreed some time ago that CMAG should examine severe and persistent 
violations of the Commonwealth Principles, CMAG itself limited this remit and 
therefore we had no way of getting the message to be heard! 
 
 These are not things that we haven’t said ourselves directly to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. The issue is that CMAG diminished its own remit 
between 2002 and the review of its activities in 2010. You’re welcome to look 
at our submission to CMAG about their review. I think we did it in 2009/2010. 
 
SO: If you would, that would be terrific. 
 
KB: I can email you those things. We did this. We said that it has to consider 
severe and persistent violations across the Commonwealth. We have 
problems as well in the Cameroon and the Gambia. The Gambia should have 
been re examined by CMAG years ago; again, it came off CMAG after the 
elections in 2001. I was part of the Commonwealth observer mission for the 
elections in the Gambia. I said at that time, “We shouldn’t take them off.” But 
the Secretariat said, “No, we’re going to go down this route. We’re going to 
take them off the agenda for CMAG.” 
 
As Secretary General of CMJA, I don’t have any sanction. But the President 
of the Gambia has sacked so many magistrates you wouldn’t believe it. The 
Attorney General sacked the magistrates, but that’s only a process issue.  
The President has sacked so many judges. Under the original Gambian 
constitution, you have to have a tribunal composed of, I think, three foreign 
judges and maybe one or two others, to hear cases to remove a judge. He 
sacked two high court judges, then he sacked the Chief Justice. At one stage 
- I don’t know when it was - he sacked the Chief Justice on the Friday, 
realised the Deputy Secretary General and delegation from the 
Commonwealth Secretariat were coming on the Saturday, so reinstated him 
on the Saturday and then as soon as they were on the plane, he re-sacked 
him. The current Chief Justice has been there two years, so that’s not bad 
going. They went through about five in the space of three years! ‘Oh, I don’t 
like this one, I’ll get another one. Oh, I don’t like this one, I’ll get another one.’ 
  
Everybody knows the situation, and this is not to mention the abuses against 
journalists, and editors of newspapers. That’s another issue: the numbers of 
lawyers who have been put in prison, the number of journalists that have 
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been imprisoned or editors of newspapers that have been imprisoned in the 
Gambia. These are serious and persistent violations. We now recognise 
freedom of expression within the Commonwealth. It’s recognised in Latimer 
House. The Trinidad & Tobago Declaration on Values and Principles 
recognised the right to freedom of expression. But does the Gambia actually 
take any notice of that? No, absolutely not and many countries in the 
Commonwealth don’t. The Commonwealth countries say it’s a lack of 
resources - “We can’t implement Latimer House and the Harare Declaration.” 
I am sorry, but it doesn’t take much to just say, “Okay, well, I’d rather not pay 
the judge.”! 
 
SO: So you feel strongly what’s the point of having declarations if you don’t 
abide by them? 
 
KB: Absolutely. But apparently they’re aspirational. We’ve said, you have agreed 
to this, it’s not an aspirational document, it’s what you have agreed to abide 
by. The Sri Lanka government recently said, “We don’t have to comply with 
the Latimer House Principles.” But they also have UN obligations. 
 
SO: Is it because they feel it’s an interference in their sovereign affairs? 
 
KB: Absolutely. We followed the parliamentary process but due process was not 
followed in the case of the impeachment of the Chief Justice The Sri Lanka 
court of appeal is now divided. Apparently the President of the Court of 
Appeal issued a writ supporting the Supreme Court’s writ to quash the Chief 
Justice’s impeachment. This morning I received an email saying, “Apparently 
half of the Court of Appeal said that the President and court appeal didn’t 
have the authority to do this.” So now he’s in trouble. And that’s what 
happens. Then you politicise the whole judiciary. And now they are all 
members of ours (the CMJA), part of the Court of Appeal is saying, “You 
could do it.” Part of the court of appeal saying, “You can’t do it.” And now we 
have a split in the judiciary which I was worried about. Up till now there’s been 
a solidarity of judges and judiciary within Sri Lanka. I don’t know what’s 
happened in the last 24 hours. But there’s a split. Parliament continues to 
say, “Well, we’ve got the authority. We’re going to impeach him. And by 
tomorrow the Chief Justice will be gone. We don’t care about the 
Commonwealth.” I’m not going to say anything about whether CHOGM 
should be held there or not, because that’s not my area. But on this particular 
issue, due process was not followed. The rights of an individual to a fair trial 
weren’t followed. 
 
SO: Going back to the original selection of Sri Lanka as the CHOGM venue 
for 2013, were you aware of the debates around that? 
 
KB: Yes. I don’t mind saying that Sri Lanka’s judicial reputation hasn’t been good 
recently. I’m not talking about politics but talking about from a judiciary point 
of view. 
 
SO: I was thinking, Karen, more of the politics of the selection of Sri Lanka 
as an appropriate venue for CHOGM. 
 
KB: Yes, well there were debates about the appropriateness of the venue, we 
have had other CHOGMS in locations were there have been problems: 
Trinidad & Tobago and Uganda. 
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SO: Going back to the Kampala CHOGM of 2007, then Port of Spain (2009) 
then Sri Lanka, how do these stack up?  Does there tend to be a 
particular group that says, “This is the Commonwealth. We will hold it in 
any Commonwealth country no matter its human rights record, no 
matter –” 
 
KB: As far as I know it’s agreed by consensus. Although it may have been 
contentious, they were agreed by consensus in the end. As for Sri Lanka: the 
Canadians and the Australians were dead set against it and the UK was 
originally set against it. But what happened in Perth? I don’t know, something 
happened, they changed their views. 
 
SO: I’ve heard that two substantial African Commonwealth countries 
expressed an opinion that it should be held there. And once these two 
were for Sri Lanka, the rest of the African Commonwealth contingent fell 
in line. I don’t know if that’s in fact what happened, but that’s what I’ve 
been told. 
 
KB: I have no idea, but all I know is that we had contention over Uganda; at least 
from our point of view, the judiciary of Uganda is independent. There may be 
problems in relation to the politics in Uganda, but I do know the judiciary has 
been quite straight from that point of view. And there are definitely issues in 
relation to human rights issues. But at the time the Ugandan CHOGM was 
held, I could safely say that I didn’t have a problem with the judiciary, and 
that’s one of the reasons we went there too last year. In Trinidad & Tobago 
we had a major issue because Patrick Manning was trying to control the 
judiciary at the time, or trying to change the constitution so as to reduce the 
independence of the judiciary at the time. And I made my points known about 
the Trinidad issue. But that’s not a consideration at CHOGM venues. As for 
Sri Lanka, I’ve talked informally to people. The Sri Lankan judiciary is 
politicised. It has been politicised for years. And I’m not saying that what the 
Sri Lankan chief justice has done is right or wrong. All I am saying is that due 
process has not been followed. The government’s international obligation to 
provide anybody with the ability to have a free and fair trial has been 
compromised. 
 
 Yes, ComSec responded to the Maldives. But only four weeks after the chief 
judge was kidnapped and they only really reacted vehemently when the 
President allegedly was forced to resign at allegedly gunpoint. 
 
SO: So it seems that it’s only the head of the executive, which is the tipping 
point, rather than the head of the judiciary? 
 
KB: There are places where positive things have happened. But it becomes very 
worrisome when you let things slide. 
 
SO: Speaking of the positives, in terms of the Commonwealth as an adjunct 
to good governance, good practice, where would you particularly point 
to? 
 
KB: As I said, the ACT was a good example from our point of view. In the UK, 
we’ve got separation of powers; the fact that we now have a separated out 
the Ministry of Justice from the Judiciary and the judiciary has its own budget. 
And in many countries in the Commonwealth they have moved towards 
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separation of financial autonomy. It doesn’t always work. But there is more 
work to be done in that area. 
  
 We recently had a meeting with the Secretary General. At our council meeting 
in September, we took a resolution that we needed to put pressure on the 
Commonwealth to try and get some kind of recognition and implementation of 
the Latimer House principles. 
 
SO: Obviously there’s been a review of CMAG because of its inefficiencies 
shall we say, and you presented a report to that. Were your views 
solicited in the recent EPG? 
 
KB: Yes. And we presented two reports on that. 
 
SO: Yes. And so Sir Ron Sanders as Rapporteur was able to absorb your 
opinions? Have they come through in the final report? 
 
KB: Yes, some of them have, but not all of them. We made a submission as the 
three legal organisations of Latimer House to the proposed Charter as well 
and on the proposal for a Commissioner for Democracy, Rule of Law and 
Human Rights. The draft charter included in the EPG, was done very much in 
haste, as far as we were aware. And it was done as an example. It should not 
have been included in the final report. It was taken as a final document and 
that is why the original draft had received an enormous amount of criticisms. 
So in our submission we actually redrafted our version of the Charter and 
actually I did an analysis of what came out in December in the final agreed 
Charter and there are some similarities. A bit wordier than what we had, and 
there is one important change. It’s a declaration and aspirational. At the 
bottom it says aspirational, “we aspire to..”. We said we commit to, they say 
we aspire to. 
 
SO: Karen, although you weren’t at the Perth meeting, were you aware 
around the politics of the presentation of the EPG report? 
 
KB: Yes.  
 
SO: What was your view of that politicking? 
 
KB: To be expected. 
 
SO: Could it have been circumvented if it was to be expected? Were there 
ways around it? Was this an inevitable roadblock? 
 
KB: Inevitable. The reaction from Sri Lanka was inevitable, definitely, because 
that was to be expected. And there is still this wariness of - even if there are 
personalities in the Commonwealth - of non-governmental interference in 
governmental affairs. 
 
SO: So despite the fact you are ‘diplomatic actors’, you’re not accorded 
recognition of the value of your views? 
 
KB: Yes. 
 
SO: That’s a very exclusive view of politics these days. 
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KB: There’s a lot of rhetoric and a lot of ‘We are partners, you are partners, we 
are partnering together, we are working together.’ But the partnership is 
unequal, when you want me, you click your fingers but when we need you, 
you can wait. 
 
SO: So it’s a partnership between a rider and a horse? 
 
KB: Yeah, yeah, it actually is a good analogy. 
 
SO: It’s not original! 
 
KB: Yes, ‘the partnerships are only on my terms.’ Commonwealth associations 
are accredited, but it doesn’t give us equal standing, it doesn’t give us access 
to people; we talk to people, we can hire the rooms, we can do that type of 
thing. But if the personalities of the people in the Commonwealth Secretariat 
do not want us involved, they won’t involve us. They won’t consult us. We 
don’t have a standing right to work either as a partner or to work with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.  And so sometimes it’s difficult. We hear of 
training of judges in certain areas. And we say “Well, hang on a second.” We 
read the weekly reports and we say, “Well we’ve got something to say on this 
issue. Why didn’t somebody talk to me? I might not have the resources to 
send somebody, but I actually have a vast network of professional judges. 
You organise a training in a Commonwealth country for judges and you don’t 
even invite our representative from that country. They don’t know it. They find 
it out from me who finds it out from them. The Commonwealth Secretariat has 
a problem within itself of non-communication. But it also has a problem 
communicating with the organisations, like ours. And also it has an issue with 
involving CSOs despite Collum, despite the high level review, despite the 
EPG, you feel like second class citizens. 
 
SO: I’m going to suggest this to you, you don’t have to agree: is that 
inevitably a problem of a civil society organisation? I’m not suggesting 
that this is grassroots activism, because your members have a 
professional standing and it could be said that in some ways, NGOs, 
civil society organisations are a necessary and valuable safety valve. 
 
KB: As Commonwealth Associations with accreditation, we have always been led 
to believe that we are organisations that work in partnership towards the 
same goals. That is towards the goals of implementation of the 
Commonwealth fundamental principles, of democracy and development, 
whatever you talk about it. We’ve always been told every time we’re talking 
about it, and we believe it ourselves, that we’re working together in 
partnerships towards the Commonwealth fundamental values. We have never 
ever been lobbying or lobbyist organisations. We have always worked 
towards the fundamental goals. We do advocacy within our areas. We try and 
assist the capacity building that the Commonwealth Secretariat is doing. We 
try and assist in our own way. And that’s been recognised. That was 
recognised in Collum. That was recognised in the high level review that we’re 
working as partner organisations. It was both an unspoken agreement with 
the Secretariat and the Commonwealth Foundation but this is changing with 
the new direction of the Commonwealth Foundation. 
 
The heads of government said to the Foundation, “You have to be more 
aligned to the Commonwealth fundamental values and the mandates of the 
Commonwealth as a whole. They have interpreted this very, very, very 
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narrowly and are now concentrating on participatory governance, which 
means that they want dialogue between the citizen - whoever that is - and the 
government, but only at a local level. They’ve devalued the professional 
expertise and input of the Commonwealth Associations. We are no longer 
considered as a part of the family. Commonwealth Associations are lumped 
together with all the other CSOs in relation to the grants that they give out and 
all grants have to be based on participatory governance. We had a total 
debate on this yesterday and I still don’t understand the issue because you 
cannot hold conferences or workshops without dialogue. The conferences or 
workshops have to come after you’ve done the participatory bit of the 
governance as a learning exercise. And I can’t ask my Magistrates and 
Judges Association of Swaziland to speak to the King to try and influence the 
way he’s going. 
 
From my point of view that’s lobbying, that’s not advocacy. It’s got nothing to 
do with advocacy. And my associations depend on me for solidarity. Where is 
the solidarity if I can’t do anything at an international level to help them? How 
do you dialogue at a regional level without having a meeting or a workshop or 
a seminar?  We talk about knowledge management. But for knowledge 
management we need exchanges and the only way of doing the exchanges in 
most parts of the Commonwealth still, because of the distances and of the 
power restrictions and resource restrictions and the limited access to internet 
and mobile phones, is to come together to have a pow wow as in the old 
days. 
 
 How can I now support the judiciary in the Commonwealth if these restrictions 
on our activities are placed by Commonwealth organisations –funding or not. 
If the judiciary in Gambia says, “We need pens and paper to write our 
judgements on.” Is that a Commonwealth issue that needs Commonwealth 
attention? No, it’s a Gambian issue to do with that particular magistrate’s 
court that we need to deal with. It’s not a Commonwealth issue. It’s not 
participatory governance to get money to pay for pens and paper for the 
judiciary in the Gambia. 
 
SO: Is this in part, a product of the small size of the Commonwealth 
Foundation itself so it’s only got - 
 
KB: Don’t even go there! Don’t even go there, Sue! Because, oh well we haven’t 
got the resources. 
 
SO: I’m sorry, you’ve heard that before! 
 
KB: We heard it yesterday, ‘We haven’t the resources.’ You’re talking to 82 
Commonwealth Associations that aren’t as wealthy. We’re not rich, but rich in 
manpower terms; as we are here in this office, we’ve got two people. CLA has 
one person. CLEA has one person. Some of them don’t have any persons. 
They’ve got volunteers. And you don’t say, “Well, we don’t have the 
manpower and the resources. We’ve lost some money.” Okay, but you’ve lost 
some money, so have we! But funnily enough I still manage to do the work, 
maybe I am killing myself, but I still manage to do the work and I still manage 
to respond to projects and I still manage to respond to enquiries and I still 
manage to do all that. 
 
SO: And you’re working as a facilitator for your profession. 
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KB: And in 67 jurisdictions of the world. 
 
SO: Exactly, and are working in a dynamic enabling way. 
 
KB: Try to. 
 
SO: You’re succeeding! 
 
KB: We’ve done a lot of training with the Commonwealth Secretariat. And again, 
the Commonwealth Secretariat’s changing strategy towards becoming a 
brokering house and a clearinghouse for projects will affect us because they 
no longer want to do things. They want to let other people do things. ‘Clearing 
house’ is what they call themselves under the new strategic plan. Yes, we 
might be involved. Yes, we might even get some work out of it. But it’s 
unlikely we’re going to get paid for it. We do a lot of work for them for free. All 
the training stuff is done without charging them. Many organisations would 
charge. 
 
 All our professional organisations as far as I am aware have never once 
charged the Commonwealth Secretariat for their time. A judge’s time could 
cost up to £750 a day or an hour; a lawyer’s time would cost definitely that. 
But all our associations have taken the view ‘if it’s Commonwealth then okay, 
yes, we’ll go and we’ll do this mission for you, we’ll help with your report, we’ll 
do this, we’ll advance your projects in these particular jurisdictions.’ And yes, 
they pay the expenses, fine, on the spot; but that’s it. All the work that comes 
out of it, all the issues that come onto it, the time they spend, if it’s five days, 
ten days, whatever. 
 
SO: Karen, I’m very aware that I’m exhausting you and you need to have 
your lunch. I’d like to ask you briefly about Mozambique and Rwanda, 
who joined the Commonwealth with very different legal systems, very 
different political cultures. 
 
KB: Right. Mozambique 1990s: I understood the logic at the time, no opinion I 
don’t think on the membership of the Commonwealth. And I understood the 
logic because Mozambique was surrounded by Commonwealth countries. I 
understood the logic because it was reward to Mozambique to join the 
Commonwealth because of what they had done for the Commonwealth with 
South Africa during the apartheid era. I actually think Mozambique to date has 
made more progress than many countries in the Commonwealth, that have 
been around for far too long; this is both on an economic point of view and on 
progress capacity building and everything. I’m not going to say ‘a fully 
success story’, but it’s good in parts. 
 
Rwanda, now: Rwanda came after the new membership idea were put in 
place. Rwanda came after Latimer House. Rwanda does not comply with 
Latimer House in many issues. The Rwanda judiciary is trying and it’s doing a 
goodish job. But I think there’s a few problems with the politics and the 
government. I wasn’t in favour of Rwanda joining before it could actually 
comply with all of the Latimer House requirements. 
 
SO: Okay. It applied for membership in 2008. Its formal first meeting was the 
Port of Spain CHOGM in 2009. Were you involved in any of the 
negotiations?  Did your members express an opinion as members of the 
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judiciary and judges about whether in neutral terms Rwanda should 
join? 
 
KB: We were never consulted on any of these issues. I may have had my own 
reasons to think that it was too early because they hadn’t got all of their 
systems in place. But it was something that was pushed through. 
 
SO: Who was doing the pushing, do you know? 
 
KB: Uganda and the East Africans because Rwanda joined the East African 
Community. Uganda, as far as I am aware, initiated the push, and then they 
were followed by other countries in East Africa. That’s what I understood. 
 
SO: My last question is on Hong Kong, and its anomalous position. In the 
run up to transfer, were CMJA involved in any way in the negotiations, 
contacting the Hong Kong lawyers? 
 
KB: The run up to the joint declaration predates my time at the CMJA. But I can 
answer it from a CLA point of view and also from a personal point of view 
because that’s my subject for my PhD. 
 
SO: I’ve hit the jackpot! 
 
KB: In the run up to the joint declaration the legal community was involved in 
inputting on issues to do with what should be in or not in with the joint 
declaration. I think it was more of submissions rather than consultation by the 
British government. Definitely the consultation by the Chinese government, 
but the British government did talk to many of the lawyers in Hong Kong and 
get opinions from Law Society members and Bar Council in Hong Kong and 
members of the Law Society and Bar Council in England and Wales that I can 
tell you for certain. And in fact after the joint declaration, in the run up to the 
drafting of the Basic Law, there were many delegations and exchanges of 
delegation more on a bilateral basis than between the UK and Hong Kong. In 
fact in the first week I worked at the Law Society of England and Wales (my 
previous job), I was involved in a joint meeting with the Law Society of Hong 
Kong and the Bar Association of Hong Kong. Their representatives had come 
to speak to Parliament here, I think mainly on issues relating to human rights, 
the rights of the individual, and economic and social rights. They were 
concerned that these rights should be protected. The CLA in 1987, when it 
was drafting its first constitution, had a Hong Kong lawyer who was a member 
of the Commonwealth Lawyers Association council and he made sure that the 
position of Hong Kong within the Commonwealth Lawyers Association was 
maintained. Hong Kong is still a full member of the Commonwealth Lawyers 
Association. Now, nothing happened like that as far as I’m aware in the 
CMJA. But we still had the Chief Justice of Hong Kong on our mailing lists 
and he gets information on anything that happens. 
 
SO: So he’s got associate status? 
 
KB: We don’t have associate status, but we have observed status if you like.  The 
CLA have maintained that link with Hong Kong since then and in fact they 
held the conference in 2007 in Hong Kong, which was the first time any 
Commonwealth Association had had a meeting outside the Commonwealth in 
a non-Commonwealth country. We have friendly links with Hong Kong. We 
have been involved with Hong Kong representative office here. They are 
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involved in any projects we have. We, as I say, we have a mailing link with 
the Hong Kong chief justice and he can input like anybody else into any of our 
projects, although he has chosen not to recently. 
 
They are entitled to come to the training or to the conferences. Anybody can 
come to our conferences as long as they pay the money! But we would not 
necessarily do any training in Hong Kong. I don’t know what would happen if 
they actually asked us. The legal system is the same as it was for the next 34 
years. So I’m not so sure what we would do if we were approached by them.  
We might be able to do something on a regional level and involve them 
through Malaysia or Singapore or somewhere like that. But we haven’t been 
approached as such for training. 
 
But the link between Hong Kong and the Commonwealth and Hong Kong and 
China has meant that a number of delegations in the run up to the Basic Law 
and in the run up to China’s taking over, have meant that the Chinese Law 
Society or All China Lawyers Association did send delegations to the 
Commonwealth Law Conferences (CLCs) in New Zealand, Cyprus and 
Vancouver. They were small delegations but they attended the conferences 
because of the links with Hong Kong. But after the separation they didn’t; 
after they haven’t said anything as far as I’m aware. I haven’t seen them at 
CLCs, I would know because I have kept in contact with the members of the 
All China Lawyers Association. The last time we had representatives from 
Hong Kong, it must have been prior to 97. I did my PhD at the Sorbonne, in 
Paris, on ‘The reunification of China and its consequences on the future of 
Hong Kong and Macau’. The French title is a bit more complicated! I 
completed it twenty years ago this month, 1993. There’s a French version, but 
they hadn’t done it in English unfortunately; I can always let you have the 
French version! 
 
SO: As my supporting documents. Karen, thank you very much indeed. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
 
 
 
